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Interview with Hilary Putnam
Michela Bella, Anna Boncompagni and Hilary Putnam
EDITOR'S NOTE
The interviews are part of the project “Strengthening the relevance of the American
Philosophy to Contemporary Philosophia in Europe and America” sponsored by the
Society for the Advancement of Amercian Philosophy and University of Molise.
 Michela  BELLA &  Anna BONCOMPAGNI  – This  conversation will  focus on your  role  and your
position with respect to pragmatism; those who you consider allies and enemies in the
field;  and  then  finally  your  ideas  about  the  future  of  philosophy  and  the  future  of
pragmatism. You worked with famous philosophers like Carnap, Reichenbach and many
others. But let us start from the beginning.
Hilary PUTNAM – My alma mater was the University of Pennsylvania. The first teacher
who really influenced me there was a pragmatist.  His  is  an interesting story.  His
name was C. West Churchman. (I do not know what his first name was, because he
obviously did not like it.) He was a philosopher of science for a while, but then he
eventually left the field of philosophy, and became Professor of Operations Research
at the University of California. He was a pragmatist, and he was a student – which
makes me a “grandstudent” – of a philosopher named E. A. Singer Jr., who was in turn
a student of William James. Singer created a pragmatist tradition at the University of
Pennsylvania. The other pragmatist at that point – she did not even have tenure, she
was just an assistant professor but later she became a full professor – was Elizabeth
Flower. So, there was a pragmatist tradition at the University of Pennsylvania. Singer
was retired by the time I came, I never met him, but I heard about him from West
Churchman,  and I  read one of  his  books,  a  little  book called Modern Thinkers  and
Present Problems. I was strongly influenced by Churchman in my undergraduate years.
For me, the pragmatist theory of truth is not that important (in fact, I regard it as
mistaken), and I don’t think Churchman mentioned the pragmatist theory of truth,
nor do I remember Singer’s book talking about it. But what Churchman talked about
was what I  call  the entanglement of fact and value.  I  quoted in one of my books
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E. A. Singer,  saying four  things  (which were  in  turn quoted by Churchman in  his
lectures): 1) knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of values; 2) knowledge of
values  presupposes  knowledge  of  facts;  3)  knowledge  of  theories  presupposes
knowledge of facts; and 4) knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of theories. I
think by “facts”  Singer  probably meant  observational  facts,  and by “theories”  he
meant things beyond observational facts.  So,  the idea of a triple entanglement of
theory, value, and fact is what I got from Churchman and Singer. Unfortunately, I
forgot all about it for quite a few years, and had to rediscover it for myself.
 M. B. & A. B. – This is one of the main topics of your whole work.
Hilary PUTNAM – Yes, this is also a central topic of my recent work. The other teacher
at the University of  Pennsylvania who was very interested in and sympathetic to
pragmatism,  trying  to  bring  pragmatism,  logical  empiricism  and  perhaps  a  little
Wittgenstein  together,  was  Morton White.  (Morton White  was  the  professor  who
suggested that I go to graduate school in philosophy!) He is author of a great book
titled  Toward  Reunion  in  Philosophy. He  and  at  the  same  time  Quine  attacked  the
analytic/synthetic dichotomy. Quine and White were friends, but neither got the idea
from the other. In fact, in a paper titled “A Philosophical letter from Alfred Tarski”
(published in The Journal of Philosophy in 1987), White reports that both he and Quine
were influenced by Alfred Tarski,  with whom Quine discussed the dichotomy and
with whom White corresponded about it. In Toward Reunion in Philosophy White makes
a point which Quine unfortunately rejected. White argued rightly that if the analytic/
synthetic  distinction  or  dichotomy  is  untenable,  so  is  the  fact/value  dichotomy.
There is an argument in Toward Reunion in Philosophy that I remember very well in
which White argues that when the positivists try to explain how you recognize a
factual judgment, they talk about “observation predicates,” but the only way they tell
you what an observation predicate is is by giving a list. So, if I say that “steal” is an
observation predicate, then “he stole a purse” must be a “factual” judgment, but if I
say it is a value predicate, then it must be “cognitively meaningless.” This is wholly
unsatisfactory. The idea that the fact/value dichotomy falls if the analytic/synthetic
distinction falls, is due to Morton White. For me, the essence of pragmatism is the
idea of the entanglement of fact-value-theory. And that idea you find in James, in a
lot of places, and in Dewey and in all the classical pragmatists.
 M. B. & A. B. – What about your successive steps?
Hilary PUTNAM – I did my graduate work in three years. I spent one year at Harvard,
and coincidentally Morton White left Pennsylvania and went to Harvard the same
year I did. I was Morton White’s teaching fellow in a course in American philosophy
at Harvard in 1948-49. But Harvard, although it admitted me, did not give me money,
and when I asked if I could get financial support for the next year, they said: “You
have to wait to the spring and pass the preliminary examinations for the Ph.D..” I did
not  want  to  make  my  future  dependent  on  that.  I  wrote  away  for  a  teaching
fellowship. I was offered one at Penn (where I had already been) and one at UCLA. I
took the one at UCLA. There was a pragmatist there too, Abraham Kaplan, who had
been a student of both Dewey and Carnap. I thought that I was going to UCLA to work
with Kaplan, but he did not impress me, and I ended up working with Reichenbach,
who fascinated me from day one. A wonderful human being and one of the greatest
teachers on the planet.
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M. B. & A. B. – You had conversations with him.
Hilary  PUTNAM – Many times.  Reichenbach was  a  great  teacher.  It  was  not  just  a
natural gift, although a natural gift he certainly had, it was not just his charisma: he
loved pedagogy, he loved thinking about how to teach. But he also could do it and not
just think about it. He gave a course in inductive logic which had 300 students. When
he died, the number went down to 30, to 10, and then it was discontinued! Incredibly
fascinating, his course on the philosophy of space and time. He never called himself a
logical positivist. He always called himself a logical empiricist, because he didn’t like
the term “positivist,” and he had the same objection Dewey had, namely that the
whole idea of sense data, that everything is a construction out of our own sense data,
is wrong.
Reichenbach  probably  regarded  “metaphysics”  as  a  dirty  word.  However,  unlike
Carnap – who was always saying that metaphysics is nonsense – Reichenbach talked
about Leibniz and Kant with considerable respect, especially referring to philosophy
of space and time. Carnap is still much more highly reputed than Reichenbach by
analytic philosophers, but I think Reichenbach’s work deserves to last, not because
his views were right, but because they can be built on. Reichenbach was interested in
the metaphysical  implications of  these great new scientific  theories like quantum
mechanics and relativity theory for traditional problems about the nature of time,
the  nature  of  space,  causality,  and  so  on.  At  this  time,  for  example,  there  are
philosophers like Tim Maudlin at NYU who are continuing that very well, and I think
it is something that should and will continue.
When  I  got  my  job  at  Princeton  –  I  got  my  Ph.D.  in  1951,  I  taught  one  year  at
Northwestern in Illinois, and then I got a job in Princeton starting in the fall of 1953,
and that was where I met Carnap – I was hired as a philosopher of science: I had been
trained by Reichenbach; my job at Northwestern had been in philosophy of science,
and  at  Princeton  I  was  also  a  philosopher  of  science.  At  the  same  time  I  was
developing as a mathematician. I think that in my first decade I probably published
more mathematical papers than philosophical papers. My first philosophical paper
came from something I said in a conversation with Carnap, who told me “you have to
published that.” It was “Synonymity, and the Analysis of Belief Sentences,” in the
journal Analysis. And then I published a couple of papers on the incompatibility of red
and  green,  which  is  something  that  phenomenologists  used  as  an  example  of  a
synthetic  a  priori  truth.  I  wrote  opposing that  view.  But  at  the same time I  was
developing as a mathematical logician. Probably, it was the importance of my work as
a mathematical logician that got me tenured in Princeton. Before 1957 I was already
publishing significant results in mathematical logic. Then in the fall of 1957 I finally
got my first semester of leave. I had been teaching over six years without any leave at
all. I got a one semester fellowship at Herbert Feigl’s Center for the Philosophy of
Science at the University of Minnesota, which was wonderful. (Feigl was an old friend
of both Carnap and Reichenbach.) A whole semester of leave! By that time, by 1957, I
was  finding  things  I  wanted to  say  in  philosophy,  and that’s  when I  wrote  “The
Analytic and the Synthetic.” A lot of my later philosophy is already in “The Analytic
and the Synthetic”: the idea of externalist semantics (although I did not realize it at
that time), the idea that reference is preserved across theory change, contrary to
Carnap’s view, and therefore also preserved across changes in method of verification,
the idea of law-cluster concepts – they are all in that paper.
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 M. B. & A. B. – You were talking about metaphysics.
Hilary PUTNAM – At that point, I had not yet started thinking about ethics. I think that
for a while I did believe in the fact/value dichotomy: I had fallen under the influence
of  Reichenbach  and  Carnap.  (Reichenbach’s  “voluntarism”  is  like  R. M. Hare’s
“universal prescriptivism”: it  is  a sort of non-cognitivism with Kantian elements.)
The problems I wanted to think about at the start of my teaching were the nature of
mathematical truths and the existence of mathematical objects. But “The Analytic
and the Synthetic” came to be written because I quickly discovered that Feigl, Wilfrid
Sellars, and other people at the Center for the Philosophy of Science in Minnesota
were all convinced that the analytic/synthetic distinction was wholly unproblematic,
and that Quine must be crazy. What I did in “The Analytic and the Synthetic” was use
the philosophy of physics that I learned from Reichenbach, but use it to undermine the
analytic-synthetic distinction that neither Carnap nor Feigl nor Sellars questioned. If
my analysis of the history of physics is right, then the analytic-synthetic distinction
can’t be right, I argued. I really think that “The Analytic and the Synthetic” is the
paper in which I found my philosophical voice. I went on, between 1957 and 1960, to
formulate “functionalism” in the philosophy of mind. Thinking about the fact/value
dichotomy was the result of the impact of Paul Ziff. Ziff wrote a book called Semantic
Analysis, which he read in draft at a seminar in Princeton in the late 1950s. He had a
very important impact on me, because the last chapter of Semantic Analysis is on the
fact/value dichotomy, and Ziff argued that it has no linguistic basis whatsoever! That
shocked me because one of my three major subjects in college was linguistics. Noam
Chomsky and I were almost the only undergraduates studying linguistics at Penn. So,
once Ziff confronted us with the idea of bringing linguistics to bear on the so called
fact/value dichotomy (which was claimed to be an analysis of the meaning of ethical
terms), and showed that from a linguistic point of view it is a ridiculous analysis. I
was deeply impressed. A few years later, I left Princeton because I had an invitation
to create my own philosophy department at MIT. I went in MIT in 1961, and in 1965 I
moved to Harvard. But in four years I created the whole MIT philosophy department.
I gave one seminar on the fact/value dichotomy during my MIT years in which I went
over  the  questions  that  Ziff  had  raised.  We  used  Ziff’s  book,  and  I  came  to  the
conclusion that from a linguistic point of view one must not pretend that any version
of  emotivism/voluntarism/prescriptivism is  an  analysis  of  what  ethical  sentences
mean, because it just isn’t right. They are not simply expression of emotions. That
was the beginning of my shift away from the noncognitivism I had picked up from
Carnap  and  Reichenbach.  I  don’t  know  when  I  wrote  “Literature,  Science,  and
Reflection” (it was published in 1978), but that is my first article broadly on ethics,
and also arguing for the cognitive value of art and literature.
 M. B.  &  A. B.  – You  mentioned  your  first  encounter  with  pragmatism  when  you  were
undergraduate. But in which way was pragmatism usually perceived?
Hilary PUTNAM – I do not think West Churchman used this word at all. I knew that he
was Singerian, and that Singer was a student of James, but I did not think myself as
belonging to a movement or sect called “pragmatism.” Churchman actually informed
his  attack  on  the  fact/value  dichotomy  with  a  deep  knowledge  of  experimental
design.  Even  great  philosophers  of  science  like  Carnap  and  Reichenbach  never
mentioned modern statistics or modern experimental design. You cannot even find
the key concept of “likelihood” in the index of Carnap’s great book on inductive logic,
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nor you find it in the index of Reichenbach’s Theory of Probability. They acted as if the
whole subject of empirical inference didn’t exist, as if nothing happened after Mill
except  themselves.  But,  because  Churchman had been doing experimental  design
during the war, he knew first hand a lot about experimental design. And his major
argument  was  that  in  designing  an  experiment  a  judgment  of  value  is  always
involved, you cannot minimize all  the different types of risk. There are two basic
types of risk,  (I)  the risk of false positives and (II)  the risk of false negative.  You
cannot  minimize  both  types  of  risk  at  once.  There  is  a  famous  paper  about  this
written by one of Churchman’s students, Richard Rudner. From the very beginning,
even in the simplest cases, the decision depends on what risk levels are acceptable,
and this is a value judgment. This is really one of Churchman’s and Rudner’s lasting
original contributions to the discussion of the fact/value dichotomy, and it is still
neglected.
 M. B. & A. B. – Could you please tell us something more about the steps you took toward
pragmatism.
Hilary PUTNAM – My wife, Ruth Anna Putnam, had a big influence. She was really much
more a Dewey scholar than I. The enthusiasm for James is something that I got from
Jacques Barzun’s book A Stroll with William James. Rorty wrote a very positive review of
that book, and when I read it I got a tremendous interest in William James. And later
Ruth Anna got me interested in reading Dewey. I did have one seminar on Dewey in
graduate school with Donald Piatt who was student of Dewey’s. In fact Piatt has an
article in the Dewey volume of the Library of Living Philosophers. But Piatt had an
interpretation of Dewey’s ethical theory that I think is too relativist. About the idea
of problem solving Piatt took a more relativist approach than I think Dewey would
have. Dewey certainly respected him, he regarded him as an important student. It
was with Piatt that I had read Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, which I am very grateful for,
since that is a hard book, and I do not think I would have worked through it on my
own without a first rate teacher. But when I came back to pragmatism around 1990, I
had not done anything with pragmatism for a long time, and I thought about the
fact/value dichotomy in the 1960s more as a result of Ziff’s book, as I described a few
minutes ago. I had no positive views about ethical theory at that time (the 1960s), but
that  suspicion  of  the  whole  idea  of  a  “fact/value  dichotomy”  had  already  been
planted. But it was a number of years before that issue moved to the center of my
attention.  I  think it  was really as a  result  of  my friendship with two economists,
Amartya Sen and Vivian Walsh, that I came to realize that the fact/value dichotomy
had an enormous negative influence on modern economics. That was when I learned,
for example, that during the Great Depression Lionel Robins – later Sir Lionel Robins,
and still later Lord Lionel Robins, basically the great man at the London School of
Economics – was saying “well,  you can’t  say that there ought or ought not to be
welfare because judgments of value are meaningless, you can argue about judgments
of value.” I came to realize that the positivist fact/value dichotomy was having an
enormous real world impact of a very bad kind. So, when I came to realize that that
issue was not a purely theoretical one, and that non-cognitivism about values really
corrupts economics, the first thing I did was to try to find a more sound philosophy
of language basis for what my friend Amartya Sen was doing. That led to my book The
Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, part of which was an explicit discussion of Sen’s
work.
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 M. B. & A. B. – You said you are not a pragmatist as you are not a Wittgensteinian. You do
not carry a membership card. But which traditions or thinkers do you feel closer to you?
Hilary PUTNAM – If I used any of these terms – this is something suggested by Mario De
Caro – I would call myself a liberal naturalist. I am a pragmatist in the sense that I am
a liberal naturalist. And I think that Wittgenstein can also be put under the umbrella
of liberal naturalism.
 M. B.  &  A. B.  – Which  are  the  topics  on  which  you  feel  more  in  the  same  way  as
pragmatism?
Hilary  PUTNAM – Three  topics.  My  wife  and  I  worked  together,  especially  on  the
connections  between  Dewey’s  ethics,  his  view  of  scientific  method,  and  his
philosophy of education: our papers on pragmatism will be published by Harvard in
2016. But Rorty also influenced me – to combat Rorty. We were not enemies, we loved
each other, but we differed very much, and differences were stimulating. I think I
clarified my own positions in my head by seeing where I disagreed with Rorty.
M. B.  &  A. B.  – You and Rorty  have contrasting but  also complementary  positions.  For
instance when he tries to read James and Dewey as anti-realists, and you say “No!”
Hilary PUTNAM – Fidelity to texts was not one of Dick Rorty’s strengths.
 M. B. & A. B. – It is interesting to have these different ways of approaching pragmatism.
Which are the themes of pragmatism towards which you feel more distant?
Hilary PUTNAM – Let me think a moment. On the positive side, where I feel closer to
pragmatism:  besides  the  threefold  entanglement,  I  also  feel  the  emphasis  on
education. The idea that really philosophy should begin in childhood. Where I feel
more distant it is not pragmatism as such. It is very hard to say. I have not done
anything really with Mead, partly because Mead did not write a book. I have done a
lot with Peirce, and James, and Dewey. Apart from a nominal agreement on a theory
of truth – Peirce criticizes James’ interpretation, he tells us “I am not a pragmatist, I
am a pragmaticist”– the pragmatists differed so much from each other. And you have
Schiller’s version! That’s the one closest to Rorty.  I  have differences with each of
them. I guess with James it is mainly the theory of truth that I disagree with. But a
great deal of what he said does not depend on his theory of truth, so I am very often
in  sympathy  with  him.  With  Dewey:  Ruth  Anna  and  I  actually  have  a  paper  on
Dewey’s Logic. Dewey hits maybe a little too hard on the idea that science should have
practical pay-off. The weakness in his Logic is perhaps there. I think it is a great book,
but  the title  Logic was unfortunate because “logic” had come to mean something
different. It is really logic in the sense of Mill’s Logic. In fact, I see Dewey’s Logic as a
reply  to  Mill’s  Logic. Mill  was saying “the way to  make social  science progress  is
reductionism.”  Social  sciences  will  only  progress  when  they  reduce  sociology  to
perfected individual psychology. And Dewey said no: the way to improve sociology is
to  do  sociology!  Pragmatists  had  an  enormous  respect  for  Mill.  James  dedicated
Pragmatism to Mill, but I think their anti-reductionism is enormously important. The
philosophy of mathematics is something that I do not really like at all in either James
or Dewey. I do not think they knew mathematics, and I think in many ways their
philosophy is 19th century. There is very little advance in the positive philosophy of
mathematics beyond Mill’s views in either Dewey or James. Unlike Peirce they were
not mathematicians.
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M. B.  &  A. B.  – There  is  a  letter  in  which  Peirce  tells  James  “You  have  to  study
mathematics.”
Hilary PUTNAM – Mill’s was the most impressive attempt to defend the empiricist idea
that mathematical knowledge is empirical. I do not think he is right, but he was a
genius who at least could make a case for that. There is an interesting comparison to
be drawn, and to be reflected on, between Frege and Peirce. Because Frege – he is not
the first in this, there is already Bolzano, there is already 19th century mathematics –
is  trying  to  show  that  contrary  to  Kant,  pure  mathematics  does  not  presuppose
spatial or temporal intuition. And Peirce was trying to say “no, pure mathematics is
geometry, logic itself is geometry, logic itself is diagrams.” I think that difference is
neglected. There is room for more than one good Ph.D. thesis on that!
 M. B. & A. B. – What do you perceive is your own contribution to the pragmatist tradition?
Hilary PUTNAM – That’s for other people to say! I do think that Rorty and Brandom are
terribly careless readers. When Rorty says that Dewey doesn’t think that ethics can
be scientific, I can point to pages in the Logic where he said absolutely the reverse. I
do not like what I call text free interpretation. I tried to say: “Look, if you are going to
write about the classical pragmatists, let’s first get clear what they actually said. They
are not just something to use!”
My diagnosis of Rorty is that the Carnapian fact/value dichotomy is deep in Rorty’s
soul. Carnapian hatred for metaphysics is deep in Rorty’s soul. What Rorty wanted to
do is to go beyond Carnap: well, if metaphysics is no good, then what is the business
of privileging science? Why should we say that the aim of language is to make correct
predictions? Why shouldn’t I say that the aim of language is to cope? And at the very
end of his life, he did not have time to work that out, Brandom had convinced him
that you shouldn’t talk about the aim of language at all. At the very end Rorty said,
“Well, it was a mistake for me to think that the aim of language is to cope, there is no
aim of language outside of language.” But it is not clear where that was going to go.
 M. B. & A. B. – How was your relation with Rorty?
Hilary PUTNAM – We were dear friends.
 M. B. & A. B. – What is your opinion on his work?
Hilary PUTNAM – He certainly gets people reading in pragmatism. That is certainly
true of him. As I said, my reading of James was inspired by Rorty’s review of Barzun.
And I Think Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature – I disagree with it – but is
certainly a first rate book.
 M. B.  & A. B.  – Regarding other kinds of pragmatism and neo-pragmatism, what do you
think  about  what  is  growing  in  Europe  and  in  England,  what  they  call  the  British
pragmatism?
Hilary PUTNAM – I have seen a little of Huw Price’s work, but I cannot really judge it. It
seems to me anti-realist in spirit, and, I am maybe wrong, my impression is that it is a
version of anti-realism. I certainly see Brandom as in many ways close to Quine.
 M. B. & A. B. – We did not talk much about Quine. What was your relationship with him, and
what is your idea of his philosophy?
Hilary  PUTNAM – Quine  is  certainly  one  of  the  great  philosophers  of  my  lifetime.
Politically we weren’t close at all. He was much closer to Bob Nozick. Humanly, he
was a lovely person. He was very old-fashioned in a good sense. For example, if you
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invited Quine to  dinner,  he would never  talk  about  himself,  he  would talk  about
something which interested the person he was talking to. Lovely manners. He was
born  in  1908:  I  would  say  that  he  was  a  man  of  the  Belle  Epoque.  And  he  is  a
wonderful writer, a wonderful stylist. Both Quine and Goodman were good friends of
mine. Goodman I think was closer to pragmatism because Goodman wants to give
equal emphasis to the arts as to science, and there is no fact/value dichotomy in
Goodman.
 M. B. & A. B. – You wrote a book on Jewish tradition, and you are Jewish. Also Bernstein is
Jewish. Is there any link or closeness between Jewish culture and pragmatism?
Hilary PUTNAM – I do not see any direct connection. Any religious tradition is like an
ocean.  I  was  in  the  Committee  on  the  Study  of  Religion  at  Harvard.  It  is  like  a
department as it gives undergraduate degrees and Ph.Ds. The great founder of that
Committee was Wilfred Cantwell Smith. He once said: “I could show as much diversity
among Methodist communities in London in 1815 as it is supposed to exist among the
world  religions.”  He  distinguished  between  traditions  –  Judaism  is  a  tradition,
Christianity is a tradition – and within traditions he said that there are communities
of faith. He felt that analytically the concept of religion was a bad notion. There are
endlessly many communities of faith within each of the major traditions. Judaism is
my tradition, but I interpret it in my own way. When my friend, a wonderful critical
philosopher, Sidney Morgenbesser, died, Leon Wieseltier, one of the speakers at his
memorial,  said that “Sidney proved that one can be rooted in a tradition without
being a plant.” I think that is what I want: I want to be rooted in a tradition without
being a plant!
 M. B. & A. B. – One last question. What do you think about the future of pragmatism? Does
pragmatism have something to say?
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